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ON FOXES AND HEDGEHOGS:
JOHN NAGLE'S MANY MEANS TO ONE GREAT END
Roger P. Alford*

"The fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing. "
-Archilochus
INTRODUCTION

"The fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big
thing," declared the Greek poet Archilochus. In 1953, Isaiah Berlin
famously drew upon that ancient fragment of an idea to suggest that
all writers and thinkers-indeed all human beings-fall along the
dividing line between foxes and hedgehogs. 1 According to Berlin, the
hedgehogs are those "who relate everything to a single central vision,
one system, less or more coherent or articulate, in terms of which they
understand, think and feel-a single, universal, organising principle
in terms of which alone all that they are and say has significance. "2 By
contrast, foxes are "those who pursue many ends, often unrelated and
even contradictory, connected, if at all, only in some de facto way, for
some psychological or physiological cause, related to no moral or
aesthetic principle. "3 According to Berlin, foxes "lead lives, perform
acts and entertain ideas that are centrifugal," while the life and
thought of hedgehogs are centripetal. 4
The simplistic metaphor of the fox and the hedgehog has become
a common rhetorical device to divide the world. As Berlin's
biographer, Michael Ignatieff, noted, the fox and the hedgehog "has
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3 Id.
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now passed into the culture as a way to classify those around us and to
think about two basic orientations towards reality itself. " 5 According
to Ignatieff,
It is not merely that the fox knows many things. The fox accepts
that he can only know many things and that the unity of reality must
escape his grasp .... A hedgehog will not make peace with the
world. He is not reconciled .... He seeks to know one big thing,
and strives without ceasing to give reality a unifying shape. Foxes
settle for what they know and may live happy lives. Hedgehogs will
not settle and their lives may not be happy. 6

Today we use this metaphor to describe two types of people.
Hedgehogs are the single-minded monists who know one great thing
and deploy that grand vision to create a central, unifying framework
for life. Foxes are the eclectic pluralists who know many things and
are reconciled to many realities that form an incoherent worldview.
There is an inherent illogic in the distinction between hedgehogs
and foxes. According to the typology, hedgehogs use narrow means to
achieve narrow ends, while foxes use multiple means to achieve
multiple ends. But of course, one can use narrow means to achieve
multiple ends, or multiple means to achieve a narrow end. One also
can be an eclectic pluralist in pursuit of a unifying worldview, or a
single-minded monist who accepts that a coherent reality is beyond
one's grasp. Hedgehogs can be at peace with the world and live happy
in their simple, unified worldview. And foxes can be miserable in their
pursuit of multiple paths toward knowledge, knowing that life
ultimately is inexplicable and without moral truth.
I raise the matter of foxes and hedgehogs in this Article regarding
my friend and colleague John Copeland Nagle because I find in his life
and thought that he defies categorization. By traditional categories,
he was neither a fox nor a hedgehog. He was not a hedgehog because
he did not know just one great thing; he also knew many small things.
But he was not a fox because his pursuit of many ideas was directly and
emphatically connected to an overarching moral vision of God and
God's creation. And by traditional categories, he was both a fox and a
hedgehog. He was a fox with an insatiable curiosity about an endless
number of intellectual and personal matters. But he was a hedgehog
with a single, unifying worldview that gave his life meaning and
purpose. Like a fox, John Nagle knew many things, and like a
hedgehog he knew one great thing.
This Article is about John Nagle's many means to one great end.
It will outline the many themes of his scholarship: (i) environmental

5
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law, (ii) statutory interpretation, (iii) constitutional law, (iv) nuisance
and pollution, (v) election law and campaign finance, (vi) Christianity
and the environment, and (vii) national parks. It will offer conclusions
on how he used his scholarly interests as a means to pursue his
overarching worldview.
I.

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

If one were to casually summarize John Nagle's scholarship, one
would simply say that he was an environmental law scholar. Most of his
writings focused on some aspect of environmental law, and he was so
prolific that it is difficult to summarize all of his environmental law
work. But one can highlight a few central themes.
Because environmental laws are promulgated by statute, John
Nagle has had much to say about various statutory frameworks. Nagle
has been highly critical of the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) and the
imposition of liability on "responsible parties" for hazardous waste
disposal in the absence of causation. 7 While Nagle was sympathetic to
the difficulties plaintiffs face in proving causation, he argued that if a
defendant can prove that it did not cause environmental harm, then
liability should not attach. 8 And if it did cause harm, rather than joint
and several liability, a defendant should only be responsible for the
harm that it caused. 9 While the "text, structure, and history of the
statute indicate that CERCLA does not require proof of causation, " 10
the obvious unfairness that results from such a scheme suggests that
the law should be changed. If a party can prove it did not pollute a
site, it should not have to pay, and if it caused some contamination, its
liability should be limited to the extent it can prove the extent of the
contamination it caused. 11
CERCLA is such a mess, that Nagle has returned to it on
numerous occasions for special opprobrium. He suggested that
perhaps special rules should apply to hastily enacted statutes, 12 that
lame-duck statutes like CERCLA perhaps should be held
unconstitutional under the Twentieth Amendment, 13 that Congress
7 John Copeland Nagle, CERCLA, Causation, and Responsibility, 78 MINN. L. REV. 1493,
1497 (1994).
8 See id. at 1536-39.
9 See id. at 1539-43.
10 Id. at 1507.
11 Id. at 1525, 1532.
12 See John Copeland Nagle, Direct Democracy and Hastily Enacted Statutes, 1996 ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 535, 549-53 (1996).
13 See John Copeland Nagle, A Twentieth Amendment Parable, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 470,
491-92 (1997).
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should adopt a "Corrections Day" to fix statutory mistakes such as
CERCLA, 14 and that CERCLA is so confusing that it confounds almost
every theory of statutory interpretation. 15 One can take some solace in
the fact that "poorly drafted statutory language, ambiguous legislative
history, conflicting purposes, and widespread condemnation as a
failure are not unique to CERCLA. " 16 But what makes CERCLA
especially problematic, Nagle argued, is that a lame-duck Congress and
lame-duck President enacted and approved it knowing that it would
not become law at all if it did not become law quickly. 17 Ouch.
John Nagle had kinder words for the Endangered Species Act 18
and the other canonical environmental statutes. 19
He wrote
extensively on the importance of protecting biodiversity and discussed
the various motivations behind protecting endangered species.
Beyond mere utilitarian justifications, Nagle argued that there are
moral, ethical, and religious reasons for preventing any species from
going extinct. 20 Measuring its success is difficult and depends on the
benchmark one employs, but generally speaking Nagle viewed the ESA
as a success in protecting biodiversity, particularly when compared to
its counterparts in other countries. 21
Moreover, protecting endangered species speaks not only to our
understanding of the law but also of our understanding of language.
In his playful article about "Endangered Species Wannabees" he cites
the numerous examples of employing the terminology of endangered
species to an endless list of people, places, and things that face grave
threats to their survival. 22
According to our elected officials,
endangered species include fishermen, ranchers, loggers, shrimpers,
rangers, Methodists, California taxpayers, libraries, public television,
amusement parks, and unborn children. 23 Nagle argues that such
rhetoric illustrates what our political actors consider worthy of

14 See John Copeland Nagle, Corrections Day, 43 UCLAL. REV. 1267 (1996).
15 John Copeland Nagle, CERCLA's Mistakes, 38 WM. & MARYL. REV. 1405, 1410
(1997).
16 Id. at 1462.
17 Id.
18 Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544.
19 Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387; Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 7401-76719; National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 43214370h.
20 See, e.g.,John Copeland Nagle, Biodiversity and Mom, 30 ECOLOGYL.Q. 991, 993-94
(2003);John Copeland Nagle, Playing Noah, 82 MINN. L. REV. 1171, 1216-60 (1998).
21 SeeJohn Copeland Nagle, The Effectiveness ofBiodiversity Law, 24]. LAND USE & ENV'T
L. 203, 247-52 (2009).
22 See John Copeland Nagle, Endangered Species Wannabees, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 235
(1998).
23 Id.
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preserving and the measures that we should employ to save those at
risk. "The challenge ... is to identify which aspects of our world
should be preserved, and to determine how the law can facilitate that
process. "24
Nagle also wrote fondly of the great bipartisan era that brought us
the "federal environmental law canon. "25
The brief period of environmental bipartisanship now seems like a
mythic legend. During the thirty seven months between December
1969 and December 1972, Congress enacted the National
Environmental Policy Act, the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act,
and the Endangered Species Act. These four statutes continue to
represent four of the six laws that form the federal environmental
law canon. Then the legislative window closed .... 26

And ever since, that bipartisan consensus has eluded us, leading
to bitter acrimony regarding the enactment and enforcement of
environmental laws. John Nagle was unusual in trying to bridge the
partisan divide and find common ground regarding the role of
environmental laws in our society.
At the same time, John Nagle was his own person within the
environmental law community. One of the more courageous aspects
of John Nagle' s environmental law scholarship was his willingness to
challenge the prevailing wisdom. He wrote that the war on coal was
misguided and that the better approach was a gradual weaning from
reliance on coal determined by the availability of reliable alternatives
and the economic development of the world's poorest communities. 27
He addressed the "green harms of green projects" and suggested that
the law has a complex and sometimes contradictory approach to
addressing environmental harms resulting from renewable energy
projects. 28 He offered a strong dose of reality to environmentalists who
attack environmental law as fundamentally broken and in need of a
full paradigm shift. 29 He argued that the protection of wilderness areas
has been so successful precisely because they are untrammeled by
human activity-except when they are not. 30 And perhaps most
importantly, he argued that we should take "legal humility" seriously,
cautioning "against exaggerated understandings of our ability to
create and implement legal tools that will achieve our intended
24 Id. at 254.
25 John Copeland Nagle, The Environmentalist Attack on Environmental Law, 50 TULSA
L. REV. 593, 593 (2015).
26 Id. (footnotes omitted).
27 John Copeland Nagle, The War on Coal, 5 LSUJ. ENERGYL. &RES. 21, 21 (2017).
28 See John Copeland Nagle, Green Harms of Green Projects, 27 NOTRE DAMEJ.L. ETHICS
&PUB.POL'Y59, 60-73 (2013).
29 See Nagle, supra note 25.
30 See John Copeland Nagle, Wilderness Exceptions, 44 ENV'T L. 373, 376 (2014).
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results. " 31 In his unpublished manuscript, he concludes his chapter on
humility as follows:
All law struggles to be humble, but environmental law's ambitions
make it especially susceptible to failure. It is only once we
acknowledge the limits of our knowledge and actions both with
respect to the natural environment and with respect to law that we
can understand how we can best intervene in environmental
decision-making. 32

He was speaking, of course, to laws that attempt to address such
complex problems as climate change. Nagle suggested a cautious
approach to climate change, one that is willing to be humble about
environmental science, environmental values, and our ability to apply
the law to solve problems. 33 He was not minimizing the problem of
climate change, but rather emphasizing the limits of our ability to
enact laws to solve the problem.
One of the most notable aspects ofJohn Nagle environmental law
scholarship was his use of stories. He would routinely use a particular
place, person, plant, or animal to highlight a legal point. Take, for
example, how John Nagle would begin many of his articles. 'Judge
Dowd was far too modest." 34 "Noah didn't have this problem." 35 "The
protagonist in our story has six legs, is one inch long, and dies two
weeks after it emerges from the ground. " 36 "Granger, Indiana is a
collection of residential subdivisions filled with nearly 800 cul-desacs. " 37 "The Mojave Desert symbolizes different things to different
people. " 38 "Giovanni di Pietro di Bernardone was born in Italy around
1181." 39
"'This miraculous plant' is how David Attenborough
describes grass." 40 In his book, Law's Environment, Nagle proclaimed

31 John Copeland Nagle, Humility and Environmental Law, 10 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 335,
336 (2016).
32 John Copeland Nagle, Making Environmental Law Humble: The Relationship
Between God's Creation and Our Laws ch. 2, at 19 (Nov. 2, 2021) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with Professor Bruce Huber).
33 See id. at 16.
34 Nagle, supra note 15, at 1405.
35 Nagle, supra note 20, at 1171.
36 John Copeland Nagle, The Commerce Clause Meets the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly,
97MICH.L.REv.174, 174 (1998).
37 John Copeland Nagle, Cell Phone Towers as Visual Pollution, 23 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 537, 537 (2009).
38 John Copeland Nagle, See the Mojave!, 89 OR. L. REV. 1357, 1357 (2011).
39 John Copeland Nagle, Pope Francis, Environmental Anthropologist, 28 REGENT U. L.
REV. 7, 7 (2015).
40 John Copeland Nagle, Restoring Grasslands by Restoring Species, 26 KAN.J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y262, 262 (2017).
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that "[e]nvironmental law thrives on stories." 41 Stories teach us how
the law operates, remind us of past struggles, persuade us to reach
certain decisions, encourage us to enact new laws, and exhort us to
take action. 42 His book Law's Environment is about five stories-set in
Adak Island, Alaska; Colton, California; the Badlands of North Dakota;
the Susquehanna River; and Alamogordo, New Mexico-to illustrate
how "we use the law and other devices to manage the natural
environment." 43 Nagle took a counterintuitive approach, examining
not how a single law applies in a variety of places, but rather how
numerous laws affect a particular place. 44 His conclusion was that these
stories illustrate how the "law governs nearly all human activities that
affect the environment, for good or ill. "45
Again and again, we saw John Nagle seize upon stories and then
use them to illustrate a particular legal point. One of his most
poignant stories was how the modest Pacific yew tree became his
favorite tree when scientists discovered that it had medicinal
properties-known as Taxol-that could treat his mother's ovarian
cancer. "Taxol did not save Mom. Yet we know that there are many
people alive today because scientists discovered that the Pacific yew
tree contained a substance that could treat previously untreatable
kinds of cancer. . . . Taxol offers just one illustration of the many
hidden reasons for why we live amidst such an abundant array of
biodiversity. "46
Anyone who knows the Nagle family knows of their love for China.
Not surprisingly, John Nagle frequently wrote about international
environmental law, particularly China. Some of his earliest articles
were about how environmental laws function in the Chinese legal
system. The one-party system in China, the primacy of executive
authority, and the lack of an independent judiciary has diminished the
role of courts in interpreting environmental statutes and led to almost
no private enforcement. 47 He has written about the growing threat to
China's wildlife even as China has adopted laws to protect that
wildlife. 48 He has studied endangered species in Asia, including China
which has three of the most endangered species in the world: the giant
41

How THE LAW SHAPES THE PLACES
(2010).
42 Id. at 2.
43 Id. at 8.
44 Id. at 252.
45 Id. at 8.
46 Nagle, supra note 20, at 1000-1001.
47 John Copeland Nagle, The Missing Chinese Environmental Law Statutory Interpretation
Cases, 5 N.Y.U. ENV'TLJ. 517, 529-41 (1996).
48 See John Copeland Nagle, 'Why Chinese Wildlife Disappears as CITES Spreads, 9 GEO.
lNT'LENV'TL. REV. 435 (1997).
JOHN COPELAND NAGLE, LAW'S ENVIRONMENT:

WE LIVE l
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panda, the black rhinoceros, and the Inda-Chinese tiger. 49 He has
critiqued China's use of clean development mechanisms to construct
dams pursuant to the Kyoto Protocol as a means to reduce greenhouse
gas emissions. 50 Most importantly, Nagle has strongly criticized China
as the "world's worst polluter" and offered concrete suggestions on
how China could confront its pollution problems. 51 His scholarship
reflects his desire to improve the environmental situation of a country
he and his family treasured.
II.

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

Given that environmental law is almost exclusively statutory law,
John Nagle has written extensively on statutory interpretation. Often
his focus has been on interpreting environmental statutes, but just as
often he has written on the method of statutory interpretation, with a
decided preference for an originalist approach.
Nagle's first article, while still a young attorney at the DOJ's
Environmental and Natural Resource Division, applied a traditional
statutory interpretation approach to the question of severability. 52 His
suggestions were straightforward: one should use plain meaning to
interpret a severability clause, and in the absence thereof, traditional
rules of statutory construction-structure, purpose, and legislative
history. A clear statement rule should apply to create a presumption
that all statutes shall be construed as severable absent a specific
nonseverability clause. 53
The severability approach applied at the time he wrote the article
was a "vast and troubling terrain. "54 Today, it largely follows the
approach Nagle outlined. As the Supreme Court recently opined,
" [w] hen Congress includes an express severability or nonseverability
clause in the relevant statute, the judicial inquiry is straightforward. At
least absent extraordinary circumstances, the Court should adhere to
the text of the severability or nonseverability clause. " 55 If Congress has
not included a severability or nonseverability clause, the Supreme

49 Nagle, supra note 21, at 218-19 (2009).
50 See John Copeland Nagle, Discounting China's CDM Darns, 7 LOY. U. CHI. INT'L L.
REV. 9 (2009).
51 See John Copeland Nagle, How Much Should China Pollute?, 12 VT.]. ENV'T L. 591,
591, 625-32 (2011).
52 See John Copeland Nagle, Severability, 72 N.C. L. REV. 203,206 (1993).
53 Id.
54 Id. at 211 (quoting]. Gregory Sidak & Thomas A. Smith, Four Faces of the Item Veto:
A Reply to Tribe and Kurland, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 437,456 (1990) ). Note, however, that Sidak
described the severability approach as a "vast and puzzling terrain."
55 Barr v. Am. Ass'n of Pol. Consultants, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 2335, 2349 (2020).
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Court has "developed a strong presumption of severability. "56 The
Supreme Court did not cite Nagle, but we can celebrate the outcome
was just as Nagle had suggested.
Nagle generally embraced originalism as the preferred method of
statutory interpretation and was critical of other approaches. For
example, he expressed deep skepticism about William Eskridge's
approach of dynamic statutory interpretation. 57 Consistent with
Nagle's personality, he goes out of his way to praise William Eskridge
before he eviscerates his methodology. 58 According to Nagle, Eskridge
proposed that statutes should be interpreted dynamically to reflect
current political trends and the values and goals of current political
actors. 59 Such a result-oriented approach may have fit Eskridge's
preferred outcome in previous decades, but writing in 1995, Nagle
playfully highlighted that such an approach must confront events such
as the massive swing to the right in the 104th Congress and the
emergence of Newt Gingrich as House Speaker. 60 Does Eskridge really
believe that all statutes should be interpreted in light of the values of
Newt Gingrich and the Contract for America? 61 Of course not. Nagle
argued that an originalist approach to statutory interpretationparticularly textualism-is more faithful to the rule of law, is less
indeterminant, and does not depend on the current Congress for
interpretive guidance. 62 By contrast, Eskridge's dynamic statutory
interpretation offers a "shriveled vision of the rule of law" that
embraces the antithesis of the rule of law: the rule of men. 63 Quite a
bold statement from a young, untenured professor at Seton Hall
challenging one of the preeminent scholars of the day. But Nagle was
right. Eskridge's approach has not stood the test of time, while
originalism reflects the prevailing method of statutory interpretation. 64
Consistent with his originalist impulses, Nagle also was critical of
other methods of statutory interpretation that are less dangerous than
William Eskridge's. William Popkin's method of "ordinary judging"
offers a pragmatic approach that guides ordinary judges encountering
specific cases to interpret a statute to fit the context without reliance

56 Id. at 2350.
57 See John Copeland Nagle, Newt Gingrich, Dynamic Statutory Interpreter, 143 U. PA. L.
REV. 2209 (1995).
58 See id. at 2209-14.
59 Id. at 2212.
60 See id.
61 See id. at 2237-38.
62 See id. at 2214.
63 Id. at 2248.
64 See Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain, "We Are All Textualists Now": The Legacy of Antonin
Scalia, 91 ST.JOHN'S L. REV. 303 (2017).
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on grand theories. 65 Popkin assumes that ordinary judges "will always
act in a conscientious fashion to aid the legislature in the lawmaking
fashion. "66 But he completely "neglects the consequences of ordinary
judging gone bad. "67 Nagle canvasses the historical record to find
egregious cases of ordinary judging gone bad. The case he cites is an
1854 decision from the California Supreme Court ignoring the text of
a statute that precluded testimony from black, mulatto, or Indians to
find that a murder conviction of a white person could not be based on
the testimony of Chinese witnesses. 68 A Chinese immigrant, of course,
was not a "black, mulatto, or Indian," but the California Supreme
Court was undeterred and vacated the conviction of George Hall. "[A]
race of people whom nature has marked as inferior, and who are
incapable of progress or intellectual development," the California
Supreme Court declared, cannot have the right to "swear away the life
of a citizen" or participate "with us in administering the affairs of our
Government. "69 Nagle cited this outrageous and unjust case as
illustrating how use of "even a modestjudicial lawmaking power can
yield results that no theory would want to defend. " 70 A textualist
approach, by contrast, would interpret the statute in question as not
including Chinese immigrants like those who testified against George
Hall. 71 The pragmatic approach of ordinary judging that Popkin
proposes "only works if performed by an extraordinary judge, or at
least an ordinary judge. Alas, not all judges fit that description. " 72 In
short, textualism saves us from the whims of bad judges.
Textualism is less effective at saving us from bad text. In an article
discussing regulation of hazardous waste, Nagle highlighted the
problems of textualism when dealing with a statute such as CERCLA
that was rushed through a lame-duck Congress and signed by a lameduck President, resulting in incoherent, vague, and ambiguous text,
and sparse legislative history to provide context. 73 Nagle provided
examples of three provisions of CERCLA that make it almost
impossible to discern what Congress intended. Reliance on the
traditional tools-the plain meaning, the legislative history, and the
statute's structure and purpose-leaves even the most committed

65
L. REV.
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73

See John Copeland Nagle, The Worst Statutory Interpretation Case in History, 94 Nw. U.
1445, 1446, 1456-59 (2000).
Id. at 1459.
Id.
See People v. Hall, 4 Cal. 399 (1854).
Id. at 405.
Nagle, supra note 65, at 1464.
Id. at 1468.
Id. at 1459.
See Nagle, supra note 15, at 1407-8.
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textualist such as Judge Frank Easterbrook confounded as to the
meaning of various provisions ofCERCLA. 74 For Nagle, the answer to
statutes like CERCLA is unsatisfying and incomplete. "[A] textualist
approach will not solve many ofCERCLA's riddles." 75 One must begin
with the statutory text, and generally end there unless the result is
absurd. 76 Congress always can address specific mistakes, and in the case
of CERCLA has occasionally done so, even while it has failed to provide
greater clarity through wholesale reforms. "CERCLA contains too
many mistakes ... to be remedied by any one approach. Therefore,
the best way to correct CERCLA's mistakes is not by interpretation but
by actual amendments to the statute. " 77
Nagle offered other examples where textualism can save us from
problems that arise when the text of a statute is ignored. 78 In the case
of the Endangered Species Act (ESA), the current management of the
ESA has led to federal control over wildlife and land use that has
engendered bitter frustration from the states, particularly the western
states. 79 But the statute explicitly endorses cooperative federalism. 80
According to Nagle, reliance on the text of the ESA could empower
the states to become more involved in fashioning conservation plans
to avoid the need for listing species and participating in recovery
efforts aimed at delisting species. 81 "The Congress that enacted the
ESA expected the states to play a central role" in the task of
"preventing extinction and achieving recovery. "82 "The restoration of
that understanding of the law is what many states request. "83 All states
need to do is step up and bear the cost anticipated in the statute and
inherent in cooperative federalism.
Ill.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

Environmental law raises a surprisingly small number of
constitutional law issues, but not surprisingly,John Nagle found a way
to write on the connection between the two. One of the more
interesting constitutional law questions to arise from environmental

74 See id. at 1429-45 (discussing Judge Frank Easterbrook's efforts to apply textualism
to CERCLA).
75 Id. at 1460.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 1462.
78 See John Copeland Nagle, The Original Role of the States in the Endangered Species Act,
53 IDAHO L. REV. 385 (2017).
79 See id. at 386-89.
80 See id. at 398-422.
81 See id. at 423.
82 Id.
83 Id.
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law statutes is whether a federal law protecting endangered species
exceeds congressional powers under the Commerce Clause. That was
the question before the D.C. Circuit in 1997, when the County of San
Bernardino challenged the constitutionality of the Endangered
Species Act, which the federal government invoked to block the
construction of a hospital that threatened the habitat of the Delhi
Sands flower-loving fly in San Bernardino County, California. 84
The D.C. Circuit issued a fractured opinion, with Judge Wald
analyzing the connection between all endangered species and
interstate commerce, Judge Henderson asking whether there was a
connection between the hospital and interstate commerce, and Judge
Sentelle examining whether there was a connection between the
modest endangered fly and interstate commerce. 85 At bottom, the
D.C. Circuit had to decide the locus of activity that may or may not
trigger interstate commerce. In classic Nagle fashion, he offered
tentative support of each judge's perspective, and then presented a
lucid explanation of why enforcement of the ESA as applied to the fly
was constitutional because the statutory prohibition was on the
activity-the building of a hospital-that substantially interferes with
the habitat of an endangered species. That activity undoubtedly
implicates interstate commerce. 86 Whereas previous Commerce
Clause cases focused on the amount of effect on interstate commerce,
Nagle identified the locus of activity as the central constitutional
question when federal authorities take action to protect the
endangered Delhi Sands flower-loving fly. 87
Nagle also has written articles on the Twentieth Amendment, an
obscure constitutional amendment that attempted to address the
problem oflame duck legislation. 88 Given his concerns about the haste
with which CERCLA was passed in 1980 by the lame duck Congress
and signed by the lame duck President, he has had more than a passing
interest in the problem of lame duck legislation. In short, he has
proposed that we interpret the Twentieth Amendment to impose limits
on the President's powers during the lame duck period. As Nagle put
it, "[t]he Constitution presumes that the regular exercise of the
electoral franchise by the people is central to self government," and
therefore, "lame ducks should be denied the power to take any
irrevocable acts. " 89 That is true of a lame duck President appointing

84 Nat'! Ass'n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
85 See id.
86 See Nagle, supra note 36, at 174, 194-208.
87 See id. at 208-14.
88 See John Copeland Nagle, The Lame Ducks a/Marbury, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 317,
340 (2003).
89 Id. at 340.
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judges and a lame duck Congress passing laws. Nagle argued that the
history of the Twentieth Amendment makes it clear that when a lame
duck Congress passes laws it is engaging in a congressional abuse of
power. 90 "The primary concern about lame ducks is that it is
undemocratic for them to enact new laws or take any other legally
binding actions because the People have already voted for someone
else to represent them. "91 And he employed the purposive method of
constitutional interpretation employed by the Supreme Court in
Seminole Tribe to write a colorful parable of the Twentieth Amendment
in which a constitutional provision dreamed of finally taking its proper
place in the constitutional fray. 92 Long resigned to live in obscurity,
the Twentieth Amendment became excited about the meaning of
Seminole Tribe. "If purpose is more important than text, as Seminole
Tribe and the history of Eleventh Amendment interpretation suggests,
then the Twentieth Amendment might spring to life after all. "93
At the beginning of his career, Nagle wrote articles on the
intersection of statutory and constitutional interpretation. 94 When
interpreting a statute, one must consider whether a particular
interpretation might render the statute unconstitutional. But as Nagle
noted, there actually are two canons that address that problem. 95 One
he called the "doubts" canon which directs a court to interpret a
statute to avoid any constitutional doubts about the law. 96 The other
he called the "unconstitutionality" canon, which directs a court "if the
statute be reasonably susceptible of two interpretations, by one of
which it would be unconstitutional and by the other valid, it is our plain
duty to adopt that construction which will save the statute from
constitutional infirmity. "97 One requires a court the decide the
constitutional question while the other allows the court to avoid such
a decision. Both approaches have their problems, and Nagle urged
caution in recognizing the pitfalls of either approach. 98
His most notable constitutional law article was Congressional
Originalism, co-authored with Amy Coney Barrett before her
appointment to the Seventh Circuit. 99 As noted above, Nagle has
90 John Copeland Nagle, Lame Duck Logic, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1177, 1179 (2012).
91 Id. at 1184.
92 Nagle, supra note 13.
93 Id. at 494.
94 See, e.g., Nagle, supra note 12, at 537-40; John Copeland Nagle, Delaware &
Hudson Revisited, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV.1495 (1997).
95 See Nagle, supra note 94, at 1496.
96 Id.
97 Id. (quoting United States v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366,407 (1909)).
98 See id. at 1518.
99 Amy Coney Barrett &John Copeland Nagle, Congressional Originalism, 19 U. PA.J.
CONST.L. l (2016).
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written several articles expressing support for originalism in the
context of statutory interpretation, but this article addressed
originalism from the perspective of the congressional obligation to
support and defend the Constitution. How does a member of
Congress committed to originalism honor the oath to support and
defend the Constitution in the face of Supreme Court precedentincluding super precedent-that is inconsistent with the original
meaning of the Constitution? 100 Barrett and Nagle concluded that the
Supreme Court avoids the problem of super precedent 101 through
judicial agenda control. "Institutional features of Supreme Court
practice permit all Justices to let some sleeping dogs lie, and so far as
we are aware, no one has ever argued that aJustice is duty-bound to
wake them up. " 102 With respect to Congress, a similar approach should
obtain. "Congress, like the Court, has the power to narrow the
questions it addresses for the sake of efficiency and stability. " 103 In the
case of super precedent, Barrett and Nagle argue that Congress "can
avoid the need to examine the soundness of super precedent by
adopting a presumption that such precedent is constitutional." 104
This article is the most cited one John Nagle ever wrote, no doubt
in part because of the subsequent judicial appointments of Amy Coney
Barrett. Much of the discussion regarding this article has focused on
divining which cases qualify as super precedents. 105 Barrett and Nagle
assiduously avoided that question. They emphasized that there "are
100 See id. at 23-42.
101 See id. at 14 (identifying cases that most frequently appear on lists of super
precedents).
102 Id. at 20.
103 Id. at 32.
104 Id. at 25, 34-42.
105 See, e.g., Marcia Coyle, Hunting for 'Super Precedents' in US. Supreme Court
Confirmations,
CONST.
DAILY
(Oct.
20,
2020),
h ttps: / / constitutioncenter .org/blog/hun ting-for-super-preceden ts-in-u.s-supreme-courtconfirmations [https://perma.cc/H4VA-R5BQ]; Brian Naylor, Barrett Says She Does Not
Consider
Roe
v.
Wade
'Super
Precedent;
NPR
(Oct.
13,
2020),
https:/ /www.npr.org/sections/live-amy-coney-barrett-supreme-courtconfirmation/2020 / 10/ 13 /923355142/barrett-says-abortion-righ ts-<lecision-not-a-superpreceden t#:-:text=Says %20Roe%20V.,Wade%20Abortion%20Ruling%20Not%20A%20Super%2DPrecedent%20%3A%20Live%3
A%20Amy,case%20that%20everyone%20has%20accepted.%22 [https:/ /perma.cc/4XNZ8S4R]; Debra Cassens Weiss, Barrett Says She Doesn't See Roe v. Wade as 'Super Precedent', ABA
J. (Oct. 13, 2020), https:/ /www.abajoumal.com/news/article/barrett-refuses-to-say-thatroe-v-wade-is-super-precedent [https:/ /perma.cc/UWF8-QZD6]; Siobhan Hughes, Barrett:
'Why
Roe
Isn't
a
Super
Precedent,
WALL
ST. J.
(Oct.
13,
2020),
h ttps://www.wsj.com/livecoverage / amy-coney-barrett-supreme-court-confirmationhearing-day-two / card/ mvQLaARCKTb3gS l 6iE l z
[https:/ /perma.cc/HTA3-A2ZMJ;
Nomination of the Honorable Amy Coney Barett to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. 2 (2020).
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[some] prominent decisions whose status as super precedents remains
disputed" but that the point of the article was not to determine "the
precise content of the list of super precedents" but rather address the
"unique challenges" that super precedents present "for any theory of
constitutional interpretation and for originalism in particular. " 106
Their goal, rather, was to provide a pragmatic pathway for
congressional originalists to take their oaths seriously without
disrupting those super precedents that are firmly entrenched in our
constitutional order.
IV.

NUISANCE AND POLLUTION

One of the more consistent themes in Nagle's scholarship was a
focus on nuisance and pollution. Beginning in 2000, Nagle began
writing on the topic of pollution or nuisance as a metaphor for harmful
conduct outside the environmental or tort context. In the Yale Law
journal in 2000, he described the problems related to campaign
finance as more akin to pollution than corruption. Critiquing
Elizabeth Drew's book arguing that campaign finance is a form of
corruption, 107 Nagle offered an alternative metaphor of pollution. He
stated that "money spent on political campaigns permeates the
political environment and affects it for the worse. In other words, such
money pollutes the system. " 108 Nagle argued that the influence of
money in politics, like pollution, is an
unseen, incremental, yet real impairment that money works on the
political and legislative system. The political environment ... is as
polluted as the air in Bangkok or the water in Nigeria. Those who
must live in such a political environment suffer the same kinds of
slow yet inexorable injuries as those individuals who breathe dirty
air and drink contaminated water day after day. 109

Rather than viewing campaign finance as a form of corruption
related to improper influence and individual culpability, the better
analogy is to consider campaign finance as a type of pollution of the
political system.
"Seeing campaign money as analogous to
environmental pollution would encourage lawmakers to focus on the
amount of money that the system can tolerate and the best way to
eliminate the harm that too much money can cause. " 110

106 Barrett & Nagle, supra note 99, at 14 n.43.
107 ELIZABETH DREW, THE CORRUPTION OF AMERICAN POLITICS: WHAT WENT WRONG
AND WHY (1999).
108 John Copeland Nagle, Corruption, Pollution, and Politics, 110 YALE LJ. 293, 320
(2000) (reviewing DREW, supra note 107).
109 Id. at 318-19.
110 Id. at 330.
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The following year he published one of his most popular articles,
Moral Nuisances.m As a young scholar I remember this fascinating
article as my first introduction to John Nagle. Little did I know that
years later I would be joining him as a colleague at Notre Dame Law
School. In his article, he argued that injuries suffered by a landowner
subject to a neighbor's immoral activity-such as nude beaches-fit
comfortably within the kinds of injuries that the law routinely
acknowledges as supporting nuisance claims. 112 He noted that
historical nuisance law routinely recognized prostitution, saloons, and
gambling parlors as nuisances, just as modern nuisance law routinely
recognizes sensory harms such as noise, odors, and aesthetics. 113 The
common theme in all those cases was not to reform society, but rather
to protect those harmed.11 4 Applying traditional nuisance law to moral
harms, Nagle argued that neighbors should be able to bring claims
related to harms arising from brothels, drug houses, or dilapidated
properties. 115 It also could apply to hunting in urban environments
where there is a community norm that harming animals is immoral. 116
"[HJ arms involving offensive sights, the inability to use one's property
because of embarrassment associated with a neighboring activity,
reasonable fears, and more general concerns about noises or
harassment are all sufficient to support a nuisance action. " 117 The key
insight was that community norms, not the moral sensibilities of
particular individuals, can form the basis for nuisance suits arising
from moral offenses.11 8
As these articles suggest, one of Nagle's great insights regarding
pollution and nuisance is to apply the traditional understandings to
novel contexts. In his article, The Idea of Pollution, he argued that "a
broad understanding of pollution can assist in society's response to the
full range of pollution claims. " 119 Traditional environmental law
identifies pollution as a violation of a boundary, in which a pollutant is
introduced resulting in harm to the natural environment. Pollution is
"a violation of each society's designated boundaries .... Each society
determines what it regards as a pollutant and which environments are
in need of protection. " 120 The response to pollution is almost always

111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120

John Copeland Nagle, Moral Nuisances, 50 EMORYLJ. 265 (2001).
See id. at 266-69.
Id. at 276-77.
See id. at 277-87.
See id. at 316-17.
See id. at 318-19.
Id. at 321.
See id. at 322.
John Copeland Nagle, The Idea of Pollution, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 5 (2009).
Id. at 29.
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the same, either toleration, prevention, or avoidance. 121 These tools,
he argued, could be applied to other pollution claims.
Applying this broad understanding of pollution to concrete
examples, Nagle has addressed the question of other types of
pollution, such as aesthetic or moral pollution. Nagle addressed
whether cell phone towers constituted visual pollution, recognizing
that aesthetic nuisance claims are not uncommon and that with such
harms society routinely chooses between toleration, prevention, or
avoidance. 122 The most common solution for aesthetic pollution is one
of avoidance, allowing its existence but minimizing its aesthetic harm.
But he notes that "[a]voidance will persist only so long as prevention
is impossible or toleration is unacceptable. " 123 In a similar fashion,
Nagle argued that we rethink how the law addresses Internet
pornography and reframe it as a pollution problem. 124 Because of First
Amendment protections, Internet pornography is largely unregulated,
such that the current approach is one of tolerance. But Nagle argued
that "[o]ur experience addressing environmental pollution also
identifies a broad middle ground between enforcing criminal
prohibitions and relying upon moral condemnation. " 125 Among those
middle ground approaches is attacking the problem through evolving
norms, emerging technology, and strategic avoidance. 126
Other articles follow in this vein. He has analyzed "good
pollution" such as party music that some enjoy but others perceive as
harmful, or pesticides that are good at killing pests, but may also harm
plants or wildlife. 127 "The existence of such contrasting effects
confirms that the harms of pollution may be accompanied by benefits,
too. " 128 And he recognized that how one defines nuisance has changed
over time, with wetlands providing a quintessential example. 129 While
in the past a landowner had an unrestricted right to drain wetlands to
"redeem his land from its swampy condition, " 130 today we should use
nuisance law to restrict a landowner's ability to drain wetlands on his

121 Id. at 77.
122 See Nagle, supra note 37.
123 Id. at 567.
124 See John Copeland Nagle, Pornography as Pollution, 70 MD. L. REV. 939 (2011).
125 Id. at 984.
126 Id. at 964.
127 John Copeland Nagle, Good Pollution: A Response to Arden Rowell, Allocating
Pollution, 79 U Chi L Rev 985 (2012), 79 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 31, 42-43 (2012).
128 Id. at 41.
129 See John Copeland Nagle, From Swamp Drainage to Wetlands Regulation to Ecological
Nuisances to Environmental Ethics, 58 CAsE W. RsRV. L. REV. 787, 787-88 (2008).
130 Id. at790 (quoting 1 H.G.WOOD,APRACTICAL TREATISEONTHELAWOFNUISANCES
IN THEIR VARIOUS FORMS: INCLUDING REMEDIES THEREFOR AT LAW AND IN EQUITY 505 (3d
ed. 1893).
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property, recognizing that "interferences with ecosystem services as
the kind of harms for which nuisance law provides a remedy. " 131
The common theme in all these articles is to take traditional
environmental understandings of pollution and extrapolate from
those policies a broader understanding of how to protect society's
boundaries from pollutants that threaten to harm the natural
environment.
In environmental law, practitioners often maintain that any
harmful addition to the natural environment constitutes pollution.
They are less willing to condemn all speech, money, foreign
influences, and especially other people as pollution of human
environments. Nevertheless, society continues to debate precisely
whether those things pollute our nation, culture, workplaces, and
other environments of our making. The task of analyzing pollution
claims is really the task of constructing ideal environments and then
describing which influences degrade them. 132

Interestingly, Nagle has also gone in the other direction and
reasoned that a broader definition of pollution should inform our
understanding of traditional environmental pollution. Nagle argued
that the Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection
Agency1 33 was correct in finding that carbon dioxide was a pollutant that
can increase climate change. 134 Carbon dioxide does not fit a
traditional paradigm of a pollutant, nor do the activities that result in
carbon emissions fit a traditional understanding of pollution. Rather
than rely on traditional environmental understandings of pollution as
rendering something unclean or impure, 135 Nagle recognized that
"[e]verything is pollution-or at least it can be-for the concept of
'pollution' is socially constructed. " 136 This broader definition of
pollution allows for a broader set of responses than traditional
environmental law would suggest. If a wide array of conduct may
constitute polluting activity, it follows that this "broader understanding
of pollution as a phenomenon that exists outside of environmental law
shows why multiple responses to the emission of greenhouse gases such
as CO 2 is preferable to mitigation, adaptation, tolerance, or any other
single purported solution to the problem of climate change. " 137

131
132
133
134
135
136
137

Id. at 788.
Nagle, supra note 119, at 49 (footnotes omitted).
549 U.S. 497 (2007).
See John Copeland Nagle, Climate Exceptionalism, 40 ENV'T L. 53, 88 (2010).
See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497,559 (Scalia,]., dissenting).
Nagle, supra note 134, at 55-56 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 56-57.
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ELECTION LAW AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE

Perhaps the most surprising thing about John Nagle's scholarship
is that he has written several articles regarding election law and
campaign finance.
There is no obvious connection between
environmental law and election law/ campaign finance, but it appears
thatjohn Nagle developed an interest in the topic either because of
his interest in the contested presidential election of 2000 or because
of his idea, discussed above, that corruption in campaign finance is a
form of pollution.
With respect to the 2000 presidential election, three of Nagle's
articles focused on how to count votes, who should count votes, and
the role of judges in resolving election disputes. The latter article
arose in the context of the Florida Supreme Court's controversial
ruling handing the election to Al Gore, and the United States Supreme
Court's subsequent controversial decision in favor of George Bush. 138
Federal judges are appointed, state judges often are elected, or initially
appointed and then elected for retention. A variety of criteria are
factors in choosing judges, including diversity, merit, and judicial
philosophy. 139 Given the increasing importance of the role of judges
in society, Nagle argued that judicial philosophy is critical. "If we
expect the courts to do things like resolve disputes about presidential
elections, then judicial philosophy is paramount in selecting
judges. " 140
Regarding the question of who should count votes, Nagle
discussed the most controversial elections in American history-the
1876 and 2000 presidential elections-and highlighted the
importance of who is responsible for reviewing the local returns and
determining how many votes each candidate received. 141 The options
include local election officials, state canvassing boards, state court
judges, federal court judges, the Electoral Commission, and
Congress. 142 Reviewing two books on the topic written by ChiefJustice
William Rehnquist and Roy Morris in the immediate aftermath of the
2000 election, Nagle concluded that the question of who should count
votes should focus on a mechanism that employs "unbiased

138 John Copeland Nagle, Choosing the judges V\,'ho Choose the President, 30 CAP. U. L. REV.
499 (2002).
139 See id. at 503-5.
140 Id. at 511.
141 John Copeland Nagle, How Not to Count Votes, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1732, 1737
(2004).
142 See id. at 1739-50.
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decisionmakers who are expert in the factual and legal questions that
may arise and able to reach a decision in a timely manner. " 143
Regarding how to count votes, Nagle draws a wonderful analogy
between how to interpret statutes and how to interpret ballots. 144 In
his view, how to interpret voter intent mirrors debates about how to
interpret congressional intent.
Textualists insist that the plain
meaning of statutory language must prevail even if there is contrary
evidence, while "[i] ntentionalist theories ... are much more willing to
honor a variety of indicia of legislative intent even if that yields a result
that conflicts with the apparent command of the statutory
language. " 145 Nagle argued that the same problem applies with ballots.
George Bush's "textualist" approach to reading punch cards limited
consideration to the hole punched out of the ballot or at least two
corners displaced. Gore's "intentionalist" approach encouraged an
examination of each ballot in an effort to ascertain the intent of the
voter. 146 The central problem of the contested election of 2000 was
that there was no clear standard for determining what counted as a
vote and the collective weight of concerns about how votes were being
counted manifested itself in the Supreme Court's decision in Bush v.
Gore.147

John Nagle has also been interested in campaign finance reform,
most notably using the analogy of pollution to address campaign
finance. 148 But that suggestion is not his only one on how to address
the problem. In John Nagle's two other articles on campaign finance
reform, he offered one idea for reform that would be effective but is
implausible, and another theory of reform that is plausible but would
be ineffective. Regarding the former, Nagle argued that we should
adopt a recusal approach to the problem of the corrupting influence
of campaign contributions. His proposal was to allow contributors to
give whatever they want to political candidates but require successful
candidates to recuse themselves from voting on or participating in any
legislation that directly affects those contributors. 149 Most of the article
is addressed at the many problems presented by his "modest little
proposal. " 150 Regarding the latter, his other idea is more plausible:
143 Id. at 1752-53.
144 SeeJohn Copeland Nagle, Voter's Intent and Its Discontents, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 483,
494 (2002) (reviewing ABNER GREENE, UNDERSTANDING THE 2000 ELECTION: A GUIDE TO
THE LEGAL BATTLES THAT DECIDED THE PRESIDENCY (2001) ).
145 Id.
146 Id. at 495-96.
147 Id. at503-4; 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
148 See supra text accompanying notes 107-10.
149 John Copeland Nagle, The Recusal Alternative to Campaign Finance Legislation, 37
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 69, 81 (2000).
150 See id. at 85-100.
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that politicians should voluntarily accept campaign finance
restrictions. 151 Because the First Amendment limits the government's
ability to regulate campaign finance, Nagle argued that the best one
can hope for is some form of reform that the government encourages
but does not require. 152 The trick is to provide "enough incentives to
get candidates to join but not so many incentives that it becomes
coercive. " 153 He conceded that the purely voluntary arrangements
have been largely unsuccessful and that government-induced limits
will only occur if the public wants it. 154
VI.

CHRISTIANITY AND THE ENVIRONMENT

Not surprisingly, John Nagle wrote several articles on the
intersection of Christianity and the environment. In the late 1960s
critics blamed Christianity for our environmental predicament
because it is an anthropocentric religion that "encourag[es] a system
of thought in which scientific progress without regard to its
consequences for the natural environment was possible. " 155 Nagle
offered a compelling response. He noted that similar and often worse
environmental damage plagued nations such as China and the Soviet
Union that have not embraced Christianity. More importantly, he
argued that there are Biblical themes that reflect a profound respect
for the environment, including "that God created the world and
pronounced the creation to be good, that God charged men and
women with the responsibility of caring for creation, and that God will
redeem His creation." 156 For Nagle, Christianity offered a spiritual
basis for protecting the environment, not destroying it.
Occasionally John Nagle argued that Biblical themes could be
helpful in understanding and interpreting environmental laws. In
Playing Noah, Nagle wrote an insightful article about the Endangered
Species Act and the moral, religious, and ethical arguments for
protecting all species. 157 Nagle made the audacious claim that the story
of Noah and the Ark offered lessons about how one should interpret
and apply the Endangered Species Act. In the book of Genesis, when

151 John Copeland Nagle, Voluntary Campaign Finance Reform, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1809,
1810 (2001).
152 Id. at 1820.
153 Id. at 1828.
154 See id. at 1830-40.
155 John Copeland Nagle, 'What Hath Lynn 'White Wrought?, 2 FARE FORWARD 44, 44
(2012).
156 Id. at 46.
157 John Copeland Nagle, Playing Noah, 82 MINN. L. REV. 1171 (1997).
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God entrusted man to have dominion over the earth, 158 the meaning
was one of stewardship, positing that "God is the owner of creation
who has asked us to serve as a trustee responsible for managing the
earth on God's behalf. " 159 Rather than rely on utilitarian argument for
protecting species-Nagle argued that a Noah principle would
establish a moral principle that reflects a strong presumption in favor
of protecting all endangered species. 160 But if protecting all species
proves impossible because oflimited resources, he also argued that the
story of Noah offered several principles in making such difficult
choices. First, the more species the better, meaning that efforts to save
an endangered species that will also benefit other endangered species
would have the highest priority. 161 Second, we should promote
diversity among species, meaning that we should favor preservation
efforts that benefit species in different biological classifications. 162
Finally, we should prioritize species that provide the greatest utility for
humans, while still recognizing that God considers all creatures to be
valuable regardless of their utility. 163 "The means that we should use
to try to protect endangered species present exceedingly difficult
questions in a society with limited resources and seemingly unlimited
needs, but the original goal of the ESA-to protect every speciesremains sound. We should keep trying to play Noah after all. " 164
In a similar fashion, Nagle argued that Biblical principles should
inform our understanding of laws protecting the wilderness. In The
Spiritual Values of Wilderness, 165 Nagle posited that the wilderness is a
"profoundly spiritual concept" and that "[m] uch of the American
thinking about wilderness derives from the biblical scriptures. " 166 Just
as religious arguments were influential in securing congressional
approval of the Civil Rights Act, Nagle argued that religious
understandings of the wilderness were critical in the enactment of the
Wilderness Act.
There are several spiritual values supporting
wilderness preservation. "First, wilderness leaves land the way it was
created by God." 167 "Second, wilderness is a place of encountering

158 Genesis 1:28 ("Be fruitful and multiply; fill the earth and subdue it; have dominion
over the fish of the sea, over the birds of the air, and over every living thing that moves on
the earth.").
159 Nagle, supra note 157, at 1227.
160 Id. at 1231.
161 Id. at 1249.
162 Id. at 1252.
163 Id. at 1254.
164 Id. at 1260.
165 John Copeland Nagle, The Spiritual Values of Wilderness, 35 ENV'T L. 955 (2005).
166 Id. at 969.
167 Id. at 981.
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God. " 168 "Third, wilderness provides spiritual renewal. " 169 "Fourth,
wilderness offers escape. " 17° Fifth, " [w] ilderness is a place of spiritual
testing." 171 These spiritual values provide insights on how the law
should protect and manage wilderness areas and complement the
other reasons for wilderness preservation. 172 Consistent with these
values, the Wilderness Act should seek to protect and manage
wilderness in its natural condition, preserve biodiversity, promote
solitude, and permit limited human use of the wilderness to escape
from the trappings of human society. 173
John Nagle also critiqued the apocalyptic warnings of imminent
global destruction from climate change as reminiscent of biblical
warnings of the Apocalypse in the books of Daniel and Revelation.
Writing in Law and The Bible: justice, Mercy and Legal Institutions, John
Nagle and his co-author Keith Mathison note that contested claims
about the end of times have been used to shape the law, notably with
respect to threats of nuclear holocaust, population explosions, and
climate change. 174 Nagle and Mathison argue that it is right to
emphasize the impact of our laws on future generations, and biblical
warnings of the apocalypse "encourage us to use the civil law with care
and humility about the future that is in God's loving hands." 175 But we
should also be cautious about using "the law to respond to the latest
vision of the world's purportedly imminent demise." 176 Incidentally,
this book was the only occasion I had to work directly with John Nagle
on a scholarly project, with my wife Leslie and I both contributing a
separate chapter to the same book. 177 We both have fond memories of
gathering in Malibu, California with John Nagle and the other coauthors discussing the vision for the book.
John Nagle was deeply interested in Christian perspectives on the
environment and analyzed how different Christian traditions offered
moral and spiritual arguments to protect the environment. In The
Evangelical Debate Over Climate Change, Nagle recognized the

168 Id. at 983.
169 Id.
170 Id. at 984.
171 Id. at 992.
172 Id. at 960.
173 See id. at 998-1000.
174 John Copeland Nagle & Keith A. Mathison, Expectation and Consummation: Law in
Eschatological Perspective, in LAW AND THE BIBLE: JUSTICE, MERCY AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS
239, 250-53 (Robert F. Cochran Jr. & David VanDrunen eds., 2013).
175 Id. at 253.
176 Id. at 252.
177 Roger P. Alford & Leslie M. Alford, The Law of Life: Law in the Wisdom Literature, in
LAW AND THE BIBLE:JUSTICE, MERCY AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 101 (Robert F. Cochran Jr.
& David VanDrunen eds., 2013).
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importance of evangelical support for climate change in shaping the
political debate. 178 Generally, "evangelicals acknowledge that the
earth is warming, but they are divided about what that means and what
to do about it." 179
This division is rooted in fundamental
disagreements among evangelicals about theology, science, law, and
the political process. 180 Nagle's own personal view is that "decisive
action against the emission of greenhouse gases that contribute to
climate change is appropriate," but that there are more pressing
environmental problems, such as clean water in developing
countries. 181
He also analyzed Pope Francis' s Encyclical Laudato Si': On Care for
Our Common Home from the broader perspective on Christian
environmental thought. 182 He offered praise and criticism for Pope
Francis, arguing that the Encyclical is at its strongest when it makes
moral arguments such as concern for the poor and how a degraded
environment harms the poor. 183 But Nagle questioned the Encyclical's
fundamental skepticism of the global market economy generally, and
corporations in particular. 184 He also noted that Pope Francis omits
entirely any accountability for government actors, including socialist
and totalitarian governments that have produced their own
environmental catastrophes. 185 He praised Pope Francis's humility,
recognizing that the Church cannot offer a definitive opinion on what
must be done. 186 It is a theme Nagle offers time and again: "Humility
toward the environment emphasizes the need for restraint and for care
given our lack of knowledge about the environmental impacts of our
action.
Humility toward the law cautions against exaggerated
understandings of our ability to create and implement legal tools that
will achieve our intended results. " 187
For Nagle, humility is the fundamental virtue that a Christian
perspective offers to environmental law. Humility emphasizes human
limits, limited knowledge about ourselves, about others, and the world
around us. Humility also respects the knowledge of others-their
skills, their experiences, and their achievements. 188
From an
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John Copeland Nagle, The Evangelical Debate over Climate Change, 5 U. ST. THOMAS
(2008).
Id. at 65.
See id. at 66-84.
Id. at 85.
Nagle, supra note 39.
Id. at 25.
See id. at 33-36.
Id. at 36.
Id. at 45.
Id. at 46.
Nagle, supra note 31, at, 340-41.
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environmental perspective, humility encourages us to recognize our
place in the world and the value of creation. 189 There is no such thing
as environmental certainty, only environmental humility. Humility of
our limited knowledge and understanding of our place in the world. 190
"We cannot anticipate natural changes to the world around us, and the
task only gets harder when we factor our own actions into the
equation. " 191 Humility applies also to efforts to address environmental
concerns through law. Any law we pass to address a particular problem
should be approached with humility. "The lesson of legal humility,
then, is that we should not exaggerate our ability to identify and
achieve our desired societal goals. We do not always know enough
about a problem, its causes, and the effects of various solutions to
produce the results that we seek." 192 The crux for Nagle is that
contradictory impulses arise from humility:
Environmental humility counsels restraint lest our actions harm the
natural environment out of ignorance or indifference.
Environmental humility, in short, supports greater environmental
regulation. Legal humility pushes in the opposite direction.
Humility toward the law cautions against exaggerated
understandings of our ability to create and implement legal tools
that will achieve our intended results. In short, environmental
humility favors human restraint and actions to address our impacts,
while legal humility cautions against ambitious schemes to mandate
the preservation or remediation of the environment. The two often
collide when the environment is combined with law. 193

This humility extends to the limits of applying Christian principles
to inform public law. For example, he has identified several themes
that provide a Christian perspective on the environment. They
include: (1) God created the world; (2) God pronounced the creation
to be good; (3) God is the owner of all creation; ( 4) God gave humanity
dominion over creation; ( 5) God charged men and women with the
responsibility of caring for creation; (6) God alone is worthy of
worship; (7) Creation has suffered the effects of the entry of sin into
the world; and (8) God will redeem His creation. 194 These themes are
notably theocentric rather than anthropocentric or biocentric. 195 But
when it comes to applying these themes through environmental law he

189 See id. at 348-50.
190 Id. at 348.
191 Id. at 346.
192 Id. at 363.
193 Id.
194 John Copeland Nagle, Christianity and Environmental Law, in CHRISTIAN
PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT 435, 438-442 (Michael W. McConnell, Robert F.
Cochran,Jr. & Angela C. Carmella eds., 2001).
195 Id. at 442-43.
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is more complicated. He argued that we must balance our concern for
creation with other concerns, such as protecting the poor and the
needy, and concerns about equity and justice "that prevent the
government from placing a disproportionate burden on any
individuals" in defense of the common good. 196 "[T] here can be no
confident conclusions about the relation between Christian
environmental teaching and federal environmental statutes. " 197
Thoughtful Christians will disagree about environmental law, just as
they disagree about other legal and political issues.
VIL

NATIONAL PARKS

One of the most endearing interests that John Nagle had was
national parks, particularly near the end of his career. It is the
scholarly interest that he talked about the most in my interactions with
him, and almost everyone on the Notre Dame law faculty has stories of
John Nagle's national park stories. Nagle's trips to national parks were
anything but wasteful or pointless, for John Nagle was quickly
becoming one of the country's leading legal experts on national parks.
He visited fifty-two of the sixty-three national parks in the country, and
he would always return from those trips with stories and photos. Even
the most obscure and remote national park was worthy of his time and
attention. His uncompleted manuscript was entitled America the
Beautiful: Saving the Scenery of Our National Parks. 198 In that manuscript
he wrote, " [w] hile other nations celebrate their history and their
culture, we proclaim our land's beauty. " 199 The thesis of his unfinished
book was that the scenic beauty of the national parks is taken for
granted and is under threat. Nagle sought to answer why we care so
much about scenic beauty, how do we decide which places are
especially scenic, and what do we do to ensure that we can enjoy the
most scenic places that our land has to offer. 200
Other articles relating to national parks came in two forms. First,
he has written about the patchwork of laws that impact the
management and protection of national parks. One of John Nagle's
most interesting articles on this subject was How National Park Law
Really Works, examining in great detail the legislation governing the
management of our national parks-the Organic Act of 1916-and its
dual purpose to promote conservation and enjoyment of our national

196 Id. at 449-50.
197 Id. at 444.
198 John Copeland Nagle, America the Beautiful: Saving the Scenery of Our National
Parks (Nov. 11, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
199 Id. at 3.
200 See id. at 4-5.
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parks. 201 In the absence of any significant judicial scrutiny over the
National Park Service's exercise of its discretion to balance
conservation and enjoyment, it might appear that the NPS has broad
authority to strike the proper balance between those two fundamental
objectives. 202 But "[t]he very characteristics of a national park-rare
wildlife, wilderness areas, clean air and water, abundant wetlands,
historic structures, free-flowing rivers-subject park management" to
additional federal regulation pursuant to other environmental laws. 203
The consequence of this statutory overlay is that "courts have
overturned NPS management decisions that would have authorized
opportunities to enjoy national parks because those decisions violated
these other federal environmental statutes. " 204 At the same time,
Congress has passed site-specific statutes that promote the mandate for
enjoyment. In national park designation statutes, Congress often
includes provisions for how the park should be managed, including
the construction of roads and lodging, the use of recreation vehicles,
and the authorization of hunting, fishing, and trapping. 205 In addition,
Congress also has passed legislation to resolve NPS management
decisions regarding the proper use of national parks. 206 Nagle praised
this patchwork of laws as an appropriate way to balance the
conservation and enjoyment of our national parks. It presumes NPS
expertise but also recognizes that certain environmental values are
entitled to special protection, while also acknowledging that Congress
may mandate a particular result based on its own balance of competing
values. 207
His interest in national parks led him to write on a broader
category of laws-he called them site-specific laws-in which Congress
has legislated with respect to specific places. 208 While we typically
analyze laws of general application, those laws "should not overshadow
the important role available to laws focusing on particular places. "209
Among such site-specific laws is the Organic Act, 210 which grants
Congress the exclusive authority to determine which federal lands
qualify for status as a national park. Nagle argued that "site-specific
legislation is appropriate when (a) there are convincing reasons for
201 John Copeland Nagle, HowNationalParkLawReally Works, 86 U. COLO. L. REV. 861
(2015).
202 See id. at 865.
203 Id.
204 Id.
205 Id. at 903-4.
206 See id. at 909-22.
207 Id. at 866.
208 John Copeland Nagle, Site-Specific Laws, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2167 (2013).
209 Id. at 2187.
210 Id. at 2169.

114

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW REFLECTION

[VOL.

97:1

adopting special rules for a particular place, (b) there is no agreement
for the establishment of a new general rule, and (c) the legislation is
enacted through transparent procedures. "211 The designation of
national parks satisfies all of those criteria.
Second, Nagle wrote about specific national parks and the legal
issues that arise in the context of those parks. Much to the chagrin of
local Indiana boosters, 212 Nagle sharply criticized the establishment of
the Indiana Dunes National Park. Although the Indiana Dunes in his
adopted state are "a treasure," according to Nagle they are not in the
same league as national parks such as Yosemite, the Grand Tetons, and
the Grand Canyon. 213 "The problem with making the dunes a national
park is that it would dilute what a national park means. " 214 Such
designations, along with other mistakes like the Hot Springs National
Park, the Cuyahoga Valley National Park and the Gateway Arch
National Park, are inconsistent with the original vision of national
parks recognized for the most scenic and special places in the
country. 215 "National parks will remain our most special places only if
our most special places are made national parks. "216
His article on the Katmai National Park-located 300 miles
southwest of Anchorage-highlighted the difficulty of balancing the
statutory mandate in the Organic Act of conservation with the
enjoyment of the scenic beauty of our national parks. 217 For Katmai,
conservation is easy, but enjoyment is difficult. How does the National
Park Service exercise its broad discretion and properly fulfill the
mandate to promote enjoyment of an amazing national park that is so
remote and inaccessible? Katmai is among the least visited national

211 Id. at 2180.
212 See, e.g., Our Opinion: Indiana Dunes Deserving of National Park Designation, S. BEND
TRIB.
Qan.
24,
2019),
https:/ /www.southbendtribune.com/ story/ opinion/2019/01/24/ our-opinion-indianadunes-deserving-of-national-park-<lesignatio/ 46363663/ [https:/ /perma.cc/7ADS-SXDX].
213 John Copeland Nagle, Upgrading the Indiana Dunes to a National Park is a Horrible
Idea, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 5, 2017, at 20; John Copeland Nagle, Viewpoint: Indiana Dunes a
Deserving Lakeshore, Not an Undeserving National Park, S. BEND TRIB. (Feb. 1, 2019),
https:/ /www.southbendtribune.com/ story/ opinion/2019 /02/01/ iewpoint-indianadunes-a-<leserving-lakeshore-not-an-undeserving-national-park/ 45 726209 /
[https:/ /perma.cc/3ZZS-S84Z].
214 John Copeland Nagle, Viewpoint: Indiana Dunes a Deserving Lakeshore, Not an
Undeserving
National
Park,
S.
BEND
TRIB.
(Feb.
1,
2019),
https:/ /www.southbendtribune.com/ story/ opinion/2019 /02/01/ iewpoint-indianadunes-a-<leserving-lakeshore-not-an-undeserving-national-park/ 45 726209 /
[https:/ /perma.cc/3ZZS-S84Z].
215 See id.
216 John Copeland Nagle, Upgrading the Indiana Dunes to a National Park is a Horrible
Idea, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 5, 2017, at 20.
217 See John Copeland Nagle, Enjoying Katmai, 33 AlASKAL. REV. 65 (2016).
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parks in the country, and Nagle argued that efforts to increase the
number of visitors requires a more concerted effort to promote more
access and more facilities. 218 "The challenge remaining for those
crafting the laws and management policies for Katmai is to enable
additional enjoyment while conserving the features that make Katmai
worth visiting. "219 While environmentalists typically express concern
about promoting conservation in our most visited national parks,
Nagle noted that we also should be concerned about promoting
enjoyment in our least visited parks.
He wrote a long article on the Mojave Desert that addressed the
issue of "aesthetic regulation. "220 It tells the story of how desert
landscapes such as the Mojave Desert-which encompasses the Mojave
National Preserve, Death Valley National Park, and Joshua Tree
National Park-have been perceived "as a wasteland to be avoided, a
resource to be exploited, or a beautiful landscape to be preserved. "221
These "different reactions from different people" are "strongly held
and reasonable, which challenges the law's ability to accommodate
them. "222 The law typically identifies scenic places and then designates
them accordingly. But the law has been less helpful in instructing
federal, state, and local authorities how to maximize the visual
experience of deserts such as the Mojave Desert in the face of
contrasting perceptions and competing demands to use such deserts
for productive purposes, such as for solar energy. 223 Nagle argued that
government decisions about how to manage contested landscapes
suggest that the best approach is a prospective decision-making process
that solicits public involvement to identify contrasting perceptions and
find ways to honor them. 224
Finally, in his article on the history of the Grand Canyon-the last
article John Nagle ever published-he addressed the counterintuitive
story of how national park designation played only a modest role in
protecting its scenic beauty. 225 From the time President Benjamin
Harrison proposed designating the Grand Canyon as a national park
in 1882, the scenic beauty of the canyon was preserved because of its
protected status based on other designations. The Grand Canyon was
a national forest in 1893, then a game reserve in 1906, and a national

218 See id. at 97.
219 Id.
220 Nagle, supra note 38, at 1358.
221 Id. at 1361.
222 Id. at 1360.
223 See id. at 1404-5.
224 Id. at 1360.
225 John Copeland Nagle, V\,'hat if the Grand Canyon Had Become the Second National Park?,
51 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 675,678 (2019).
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monument in 1908, and then finally a national park in 1919. 226 Nagle
noted that "the contrast between national park status and other land
conservation designations was not nearly as striking as one may
anticipate" 227 and that the previous designations "enabled the Grand
Canyon to resist the despoliation that many conservationists feared. "228
A footnote to this last article read:
Professor John Copeland Nagle passed away on May 18, 2019,
during the editorial process. Final edits were overseen by Professor
Nagle's colleagues at the Notre Dame Law School. His colleagues
and his family are deeply grateful to the Arizona State Law Journal
for its work in bringing this article to publication. He will be dearly
missed. Requiescat in pace. 229

Funny how a footnote can bring a smile to your face.
CONCLUSION

On June 30, 2016, John Nagle hosted a group of Notre Dame
faculty at his house for a discussion on an early draft of his forthcoming
book on environmental humility. The tentative title for his book was
Making Environmental Law Humble: The Relationship Between God's
Creation and Our Laws. By his own admission the book was an early
draft. But it was of immense importance to him. In an email to the
group, he wrote, "I suspect that I could continue to work on it for years
and years, but now I am decidedly ready to get your thoughts about it
before I proceed. "230 He wanted our help on key issues in the book,
and so he decided to bring all of us together at his house to discuss his
draft manuscript.
I remember the gathering well. Among the participants were Amy
Coney Barrett, Nicole Garnett, Rick Garnett, Bruce Huber, Bill Kelley,
Randy Kozel, Mark Noll, and Carter Snead. We sat together around
the Nagle's large dining room table overlooking their lush, wooded
backyard. We discussed the plan of the book, the concept of the ideal
environment, and his chapters on the improved, natural, and
harmonious environment. We shared lunch together. We then
continued in the afternoon to discuss the separation of environmental
powers, environmental and legal humility, and the proper role of
environmental lawmaking. We concluded with general suggestions for
how John Nagle should complete the manuscript-the manuscript

226 Id. at 691-711.
227 Id. at 711-12.
228 Id. at 717.
229 Id. at 675, annot.
230 Email from John Nagle, Professor of L. at Notre Dame L. Sch. to Roger Alford,
ProfessorofL. at Notre Dame L. Sch., eta!. Qune 13, 2016) (on file with author).
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that remains unpublished due to his untimely death. Unlike a typical
scholarly workshop, the discussion around John Nagle's dining room
table felt different, somehow intimate. It was an early draft with plenty
of gaps and omissions. But this reflected John's willingness to be
humble, genuine, and vulnerable to criticism among friends and
colleagues, which included the most prolific and gifted members of
the faculty. Throughout the day there was a warmth, a kinship, and an
affection for John and his scholarship.
It was just one day in the life of John Nagle. But that gathering
was emblematic of the spirit of John Nagle. The scholarship of John
Nagle flowed out of the person of John Nagle. Because he was
inherently social, his writing was typically narrative and colloquial,
imbued with stories of people and places. In truth, there were almost
always people and places connected to his scholarship. During John
Nagle's memorial service on June 3, 2018, constitutional scholar
Michael Paulsen said that 'John Nagle was the best friend I ever had
and the best man I've ever known .... Being a friend of John Nagle
was the easiest, most natural thing in the whole world .... John was a
best friend to many people. " 231 Paulsen said that John would call him
out of the blue and say, "Guess where I'm calling you from now?" As
Paulsen put it, invariably John would be on a remote highway headed
to a national park nobody visited in order to research an endangered
species nobody cared about. 232 His daughters Laura and Julia similarly
spoke at his service about memorable travels with him to remote parts
of the country and the world. "I love that Dad prioritized taking his
girls on trips with him. He joyously showed me the world, and gave me
so many memories with him," Laura said in her remarks. "Dad's joy of
exploring national parks or areas of outstanding natural beauty was
contagious." 233 His youngest daughter Julia said simply, "My Dad
taught me how to love all of God's creation." 234 As these stories
suggest,John Nagle always found ways to include his friends and family
in his research and travels and included them in his exploration and
work related to the beauty of God's creation.
John Nagle once described his "lifetime project" as learning "how
to best integrate Christian teaching and environmental law. "235 But as
this brief summary of his scholarship suggests,John Nagle was not only

231 Audio tape: John Nagle Memorial Service, at 38:40 Qune 3, 2018) (on file with
author).
232 Id. at 36:00.
233 Id. at 51:00.
234 Id. at 55:00.
235 John Copeland Nagle, Making Environmental Law Humble: The Relationship
Between God's Creation and Our Laws ch. 1, at 1 (Nov. 2, 2021) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with Professor Bruce Huber).
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an environmental law scholar, much less a Christian environmental law
scholar. He was both of those, and yet much more. Lisa Nagle recalled
recently to me that John was always writing, always excited about his
latest project. Those projects were varied and eclectic. In this sense
he was a fox who pursued many ends, often unrelated to one another.
Who else but John Nagle wrote about lame duck presidents, Delhi
Sands flower-loving flies, Noah's ark, Katmai National Park, Chinese
immigrants, wilderness spirituality, campaign finance reform, statutory
originalism, Pope Francis's anthropology, obscure constitutional
amendments, the Badlands of North Dakota, hanging chads, moral
nuisances, evangelical environmentalists, congressional recusals,
aesthetic pollution, and legal humility? Honestly, who does that? But
despite his eclectic interests,John was fundamentally a hedgehog. He
deployed his grand vision of the world to create a central, unifying
framework for his life. His insatiable curiosity about the world
reflected his core belief about the world. John's fundamental belief
was in the love of God manifest in the special revelation ofJesus Christ
and in the general revelation of God's creation. He had a foundational
desire to display love of God, care for God's children, and curiosity
about God's creation.
His scholarly work was rarely explicitly
Christian. But all his scholarly work-and indeed all of his lifereflected the unique and amazing Christian scholar and person that
was John Copeland Nagle. Like a fox,John Nagle knew many things.
Like a hedgehog, he knew One Great Thing.

